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Abstract
The problem of localizing nodes without GPS based on a small fraction of anchor nodes which are
aware of their positions is considered to be an important service for applications in wireless ad
hoc networks. With an adversary trying to mislead nodes about their estimated locations, several
approaches aiming to defeat attackers by means of robustness instead of cryptographic measures
have been proposed in the past. Nevertheless, these robust techniques focus on single-hop based
localization. Hence, we investigate the impact of employing the well-known Least Median of
Squares (LMS) algorithm in the context of the multi-hop based DV-hop approach. We argue that
in this case LMS is no longer able to meet its requirements. We examine the source of this behavior
and show that LMS leads to more accurate results when using the median to obtain average hop
lengths in DV-hop. Furthermore, we investigate the feasibility of performing lateration using
the l1-norm instead of the typically employed l2-norm, as well as the possibility of enhancing
the robustness of LMS using lateration based on the l1-norm. Contrary to our expectations,
the l1-norm only results in a slight, neglectable advantage compared to the computationally less
expensive l2-norm lateration.
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1 Introduction
Wireless Ad Hoc Networks offer a wide variety of applications ranging from environmental
monitoring to intrusion detection or battlefield surveillance. An important service for these
applications is the localization of the participants without relying on GPS. Thus the problem
of localizing nodes using only a small fraction of anchor nodes which are aware of their
positions has gained much attention from researchers in the past. While these mechanisms
usually assume cooperative behavior among the participants, certain applications demand
the deployment of nodes in an adversarial environment. In order to prevent an adversary
from misleading nodes about their locations, a variety of secure localization schemes have
been presented the last few years [5]. Yet most of these approaches require single-hop
communication between nodes and anchors to conduct distance measurements. In contrast,
multi-hop based schemes only rely on a few anchors to measure the distance between nodes
and anchors. A well-known example is the DV-hop approach, where anchors broadcast
small beacon messages holding their locations [3]. Nodes receiving such a message increment
a contained hop count value and broadcast the adjusted message, assuming it provides a
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shorter path to the respective anchor. Once a node has received the messages from at least
three anchors, it is able to perform lateration to obtain its coordinates using the according
set of references (xi, yi, di), where (xi, yi) is the position of the anchor and di the respective
measured distance. In order to obtain a distance measurement di, the number of hops of
the shortest path to the respective anchor is multiplied with an average hop length value.
Anchors estimate this hop length by calculating the sum of the euclidean distances to the
other known anchors and dividing it by the sum of the number of hops of the shortest
paths to the according anchors. Then, the hop length is broadcast in a separate message or
piggy-backed with a beacon message sent out at regular intervals. Finally, nodes receiving
these estimates from several anchors calculate the mean to obtain an aggregated hop length.
Based on these observations, this work provides the following contributions: First, we
investigate the influence of employing the Least Median of Squares (LMS) approach in the
multi-hop based DV-hop scheme. We show that LMS is unable to defeat a basic attack in
the originally described DV-hop algorithm. Second, we show that estimating an average
hop length using a slightly modified technique based on the median enables LMS to again
provide robustness against this attack. Finally, we investigate the feasibility of the l1-norm
in contrast to the widely-used l2-norm, as well as the possibility of enhancing the robustness
of LMS by employing the l1-norm.
2 Linear Least Squares Lateration
Given the set ofN references (xi, yi, di), a node would ideally reside at the point of intersection
of at least three circles with center (xi, yi) and radius di. Hence, assuming no distance
measurement errors, it would be sufficient to find this point of intersection by solving a system
of non-linear circle equations [2]. In reality, however, these circles usually do not intersect
at a specific location (i.e. the system of equations is not solvable). In this case, a least
squares approach minimizing the sum of residue squares can be used to estimate a position.
However, this involves solving a non-linear optimization problem, which is usually considered
too expensive as it requires methods of global optimization. Therefore, the result of the
non-linear least squares approach is approximated by using the Linear Least Squares (LLS)
technique which is based on the following non-linear optimization problem [2]:(
xˆ
yˆ
)
= argmin
x
‖Ax− b‖p A ∈ R(N,2), x ∈ R2, b ∈ RN (1)
Here, ‖·‖p is the lp-norm (p ≥ 1 is a parameter which may be chosen to fit a specific
application) and Ax = b is the matrix form of a system of linear equations. This system of
equations is obtained by subtracting the mean of all left and right parts of the system of
non-linear circle equations from each equation according to [2]. Furthermore, it is easy to see
that (xˆ, yˆ)T is a solution of MIN
x
‖Ax− b‖p if and only if it is a solution of MINx ‖Ax− b‖
p
p.
Usually, the l2-norm (p = 2) is used to estimate a location. This is due to the fact
that, for p = 2, a location can be estimated by simply solving a system of linear equations
using QR-factorization for example. Nevertheless, while employing the l2-norm (p = 2)
is considered to be the most feasible approach, it is known to be vulnerable to malicious
references forging the location or the distance to an anchor [2].
The LLS approach may also be applied to fit a function to a given set of data points.
In this case, compared to the l2-norm, the l1-norm is generally less vulnerable to outliers
contained in the data, e.g. caused by measurement errors. Therefore, we are interested in
whether using the l1-norm instead of the l2-norm might increase the robustness of lateration
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against attackers. Employing the l1-norm, the position of a node is estimated by solving the
following optimization problem:(
xˆ
yˆ
)
= argmin
x
‖Ax− b‖1 = argminx
{
N∑
i=1
|aix− bi|
}
(2)
This problem can be formulated as a linear optimization problem by introducing a vector
h = (h1, h2, . . . , hN ) ∈ RN of auxiliary variables hi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , N}:
MIN
x
{
N∑
i=1
|aix− bi|
}
⇔ MIN
x,h
{
N∑
i=1
hi
∣∣∣∣∣ − h ≤ Ax− b ≤ h
}
Hence, we obtain:
MIN
x,h
{
(0T ,1T )
(
x
h
)∣∣∣∣( A −E−A −E
)(
x
h
)
≤
(
b
−b
)}
where E is the identity matrix of dimension N , 0 = (0, 0)T ∈ R2 and 1 = (1, 1, . . . , 1)T ∈ RN .
Depending on the norm, we refer to the respective estimation technique as l1-LLS or l2-
LLS. While l1-LLS is computationally more expensive than l2-LLS, a potential increase in
robustness might justify solving a simple linear optimization problem.
3 Threats and Countermeasures
There are a variety of attacks which aim at deceiving nodes about their locations [5]:
Impersonation attack, sybil attack, wormhole attack and location reference attack. It should
be noted here that while a Denial-of-Service attack (e.g. jamming) might also disrupt the
process of localization, an adversary is usually assumed to try to unnoticeably mislead nodes
about their whereabouts. Several mechanisms aiming to defeat one or more of the above
mentioned threats have been proposed. They can be divided into prevention, detection and
filtering (i.e. robust) techniques [5]. In the past, several robust location estimation schemes
have been proposed. Within this work, we only consider the well-known Least Median of
Squares (LMS) filtering approach [2], focusing on possible advantages of performing lateration
using the l1-norm instead of the commonly used l2-norm, as well as its behavior in the context
of the multi-hop based DV-hop scheme. In addition, we only focus on the colluding location
reference attack where a number of malicious anchors broadcast beacon messages with false
coordinates. These coordinates are shifted into a certain common direction away from the
true positions. This threats is also known as false beacon location attack and very popular in
terms of evaluating the robustness of location estimation schemes [2, 5].
LLS employing the l2-norm is not robust against outliers [2]. Li et al. therefore propose
to minimize the median instead of the sum of residue squares based on the method described
in [4]. Finding the exact solution of this non-linear optimization problem is computationally
expensive. Thus, the authors present the following algorithm as an approximate solution [2]:
1. Randomly draw M = 20 subsets of size 4 from the set of given references.
2. Estimate a location for each subset j = 1, . . . ,M using l2-LLS and calculate the median
of the estimation residuals r2ij to each anchor i = 1, . . . , N .
3. Define m = argminjmedi
{
r2ij
}
(least median of all medians of each subset).
4. Calculate s0 = 1.4826(1 + 5N−2 )
√
medir2im.
5. Assign a weight wi to each reference, where wi = 1 if | ris0 | ≤ 2.5 or 0 otherwise.
6. Compute a weighted least squares of all given references using weights wi. This corresponds
to estimating a position using l2-LLS with only the references with weight wi = 1.
Sander Wozniak, Tobias Gerlach, and Guenter Schaefer 185
4 Evaluation
To evaluate the impact of employing LMS in DV-hop, as well as investigating the suitability
of using the l1-norm instead of the l2-norm, we implemented DV-hop using OMNeT++
(http://www.omnetpp.org/) as follows: Each anchor broadcast a beacon message with a
sequence number containing its location in a total of 3 rounds separated by intervals of
roughly 60 seconds to provide the network with enough time to distribute the messages.
So far, we did not incorporate a mechanism to limit flooding, since this might result in
different contamination ratios at different nodes. Anchors receiving beacons from other
anchors calculated a hop length estimate following either the original DV-hop approach or
the median variant and included this information in the message to be sent out in the next
round. Additionally, nodes kept the most recent hop length estimate announced by the
corresponding anchor. Finally, after finishing the 3 rounds, nodes estimated their locations by
choosing a hop length from their list of available estimates and running each of the location
estimation schemes on their respective set of references. When selecting a hop length, nodes
employed the mean or the median according to the technique currently in use by the anchors.
For communication among nodes, we incorporated the radio model provided by the
MiXiM framework (http://mixim.sourceforge.net/). Apart from evaluating the original
LMS approach using l2-LLS in step 2 and 6 of the algorithm which from now on we will
refer to as l2-LMS, we also consider a new variation of LMS employing l1-LLS which we
refer to as l1-LMS. We implemented and compared l1-LLS, l2-LLS, as well as both LMS
variants. In order to obtain a location using l1-LLS by finding a solution to (2), we employed
lpsolve (http://lpsolve.sourceforge.net/). Furthermore, regarding l2-LLS, we used lapack++
(http://lapackpp.sourceforge.net/) to estimate a position by solving the respective system of
linear equations with QR-factorization. We randomly placed 300 nodes and N = 20 anchors
on a 1000m × 1000m field using the uniform distribution. The field size was chosen
according to a density required to prevent the partitioning of the network and to the applied
transmission power of 110mW, which roughly corresponds to an interference range of 140m.
In our scenario, the mean number of incoming connections at a node is about 12, which is a
stable value above the critical threshold of 9 determined by Langendoen and Reijers [1]
with a mean of about 7 hops on the shortest paths between nodes and anchors.
Regarding the false beacon location attack where anchors announce a false position, out
of N anchors, dN · e were randomly selected to be malicious. The contamination ratio
 was varied from 0 (no attacker) to 0.4 in steps of 5%. Malicious anchors forged their
location by adding a vector defined by a common direction and specific length to their actual
coordinates. The length of this vector which is from now on referred to as forged distance
was set to 500m and 1500m to examine different strengths of the attack. To measure the
influence of the attacking anchors, we used the mean estimation error which corresponds to
the mean of the euclidean distance between the actual and the estimated location over all
nodes. Furthermore, it should be noted here that the following figures all show the mean of
30 repetitions including the confidence intervals at a confidence level of 99%.
We first evaluated the robustness of the location estimation schemes when employed in
the original DV-hop approach. Figure 1a shows the estimation error for a forged distance of
1500m. Here, l2-LLS shows the expected non-robust behavior, suffering from an increasing
number of malicious anchors. Furthermore, according to our assumptions, for  < 0.2, l1-LLS
is able to provide a decrease of the error compared to l2-LLS. However, contrary to our initial
expectations, the difference between the estimation error of l1-LLS and l2-LLS becomes
neglectable for  ≥ 0.2. This may be based on the fact that the system of non-linear circle
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(a) Original DV-hop approach
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(b) DV-hop using median
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(c) Impact of malicious hop lengths
Figure 1 Evaluation of LMS in DV-hop (false beacon location attack).
equations is linearized by subtracting the mean of all equations according to [2]. Therefore,
malicious references may still be able to influence the resulting system of equations Ax = b,
preventing the l1-norm from providing a clear advantage for an increasing forged distance.
To understand why LMS is unable to provide the expected robust behavior as shown
in figure 1a, it is necessary to explain the effect of attackers exploiting honest nodes and
anchors to support the attack. Malicious anchors increase the euclidean distance computed at
benign anchors, while the number of hops between the anchors remains the same. Therefore,
when estimating the hop length by summing up the euclidean distances and dividing it by
the sum of the number of hops, an attacker is able to cause benign anchors to announce
increased hop length estimates. Computed at a benign anchor, while still being influenced by
malicious distance measurements, we call such a hop length estimate polluted. Consequently,
in the original DV-hop algorithm, with the number of hops of the shortest paths being
multiplied with the hop length estimate, a polluted hop length resulting from forged anchor
locations affects all distance measurements obtained at a node. With the median being able
to ignore outliers up to 50%, it seems reasonable to aggregate hop length estimates using
the median in order to only incorporate references from other benign anchors (which should
be a majority). Zeng et al. shortly state this assumption and propose to employ the median
when aggregating hop lengths at the anchors [6]. However, they do not mention the effect of
benign anchors increasing the strength of the attack. Furthermore, while they provide no
evaluation, we are able to confirm their assumption according to the estimation error shown
in figure 1b. Here, anchors and nodes aggregate the respective hop lengths using the median,
enabling LMS to yield its expected robust behavior. This decreases the estimation error
from over 800m at  = 0.4 in the original DV-hop to about 400m when using the median. It
should be noted here that the assumption of benign anchors supporting the attack is also
confirmed by the estimation error of the non-robust l2-LLS approach decreasing from roughly
1000m (figure 1a) at  = 0.4 to about 750m (figure 1b) when using the median in DV-hop.
Accordingly, while employing the l1-norm reduces the estimation error for  < 0.2, LMS
does not benefit from using l1-LLS (figure 1a and 1b). This may be based on the fact that for
 < 0.2, the original l2-LMS approach is already able to filter out the majority of malicious
references. Hence, in terms of LMS, we conclude that employing l1-LLS instead of the
computationally less expensive l2-LLS approach does not provide a clear benefit.
In order to obtain a better understanding of the actual filtering ability of the median
regarding polluted hop lengths resulting in an increased strength of the attack, we investigated
the local contamination ratio. At a node, the local contamination ratio describes the ratio of
malicious references among all given references. To obtain this ratio, we tagged each beacon
message with a contamination field in our simulation. Hence, this field allowed to determine
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whether a beacon contained a false location or a polluted hop length. While the local
contamination ratio usually corresponds to the global contamination ratio , transforming a
number of hops to a distance by multiplying it with a polluted hop length can result in a
local contamination ratio of 1 (i.e. all references are affected by the attack). Figure 1c shows
the mean local contamination ratio over all nodes. According to our expectations, when using
the original DV-hop approach, all references are either malicious or affected by a polluted
hop length at a forged distance of 500m. In contrast, using the median allows to filter the
majority of polluted hop lengths. For a forged distance of 500m, the median is unable to
filter all polluted hop lengths due to noise in the benign hop lengths. However, with an
increasing forged distance of 1500m, the median is able to almost filter out all polluted hop
lengths. This may be based on the fact that in this case polluted hop lengths are larger than
the noise among the benign hop lengths. We therefore conclude that employing the median
should be considered mandatory in DV-hop.
5 Conclusions and future work
In this work, we evaluated the robustness of LMS when employed in the multi-hop based
DV-hop approach. We showed that LMS is already unable to provide the expected robust
behavior for a simple anchor-based attack. However, when estimating a hop length with a
slightly modified approach based on the median, LMS shows the expected robust behavior.
Thus, in terms of secure localization, using the median based technique in DV-hop should
be considered mandatory. Furthermore, we employed the l1-norm instead of the l2-norm
to perform lateration. Contrary to our expectations, the l1-norm which is typically more
robust against outliers, only provided a slight, neglectable benefit when employed in LMS.
We assume that this behavior is based on the subtraction of the mean of all equations from
each equation (i.e. the linearization of the system of equations) according to [2]. Therefore,
we recommend using the computationally less expensive l2-LLS approach.
In our future work, we aim at providing an extensive comparison of the performance of a
wider variety of robust location estimation techniques employing the median-based DV-hop
algorithm in a three-dimensional, multi-hop based environment.
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